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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new model of on-line inference
processes during text understanding. The model, called ATLAST,
integrates inference processing at the lexical, syntactic, and
pragmatic levels of understanding, and is consistent with the
results of controlled psychological experiments. ATLAST
interprets input text through the interaction of independent but
communicating inference processes running in parallel. The focus
of this paper is on the initial computer implementation of the
ATLAST model, and some observations and issues which arise from
that implementation.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This paper describes a new theory of- inference processing
developed at the Irvine Computational Intelligence Project, and
an initial computer implementation of that theory. The research
described here integrates inference processing at the lexical,
syntactic, and pragmatic levels, and is consistent with the
results of controlled psychological experiments. The theory
centers upon a parallel-process model of text understanding which
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explains inference behavior at the different levels as the result
of interactions between three independent but communicating
inference processes. Though there are three processes operating
at three different levels of language understanding, there is no
direct correspondence between the levels and the processes.
Inference decisions at all levels are made through the combined
actions of the three processes running in parallel. We call this
model ATLAST (A Three-level Language Analysis SysTem).
ATLAST represents a real departure from most previous models
of language understanding and inference processing [e.g., Schank,
1975; Cullingford, 1978; Wilensky, 1978; DeJong, 1979], though
there are models which integrate some of the levels of inference
processing. For example, IPP [Lebowitz, 1980] and BORIS [Dyer,
1982] integrate the syntactic and pragmatic levels, while the
model of Small, Cottrell, and Shastri [1982] integrates lexical
access and syntactic parsing. Finally, Charniak's model, as does
ATLAST, seeks to integrate lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic
inference processing [Charniak, 1983], though his model differs
from ATLAST in other ways which are described in [Granger,
Eiselt, & Holbrook, 1984].
2.0 BACKGROUND; THE THEORY IN BRIEF
The theory behind ATLAST is described in detail in [Granger,
Eiselt, & Holbrook, 1985], but a brief review of the theory is
provided here to aid in understanding the program.
Page 3
ATLAST is a direct descendant of earlier work on inference
decision processes at the pragmatic level. Specifically, it came
about as an attempt to address word-sense ambiguity problems
which arose during research into different pragmatic inference
strategies used by human subjects while reading text, and the
development of a program, called STRATEGIST, which modelled that
behavior [Granger, Eiselt, & Holbrook, 1983; Granger & Holbrook,
1983], As we worked on STRATEGIST, we observed that lexical and
pragmatic inference processes appeared to have much in common.
Many pragmatic inferences seemed to be triggered by individual
words. This is hardly new news, of course, as there exist
integrated models of language understanding in which higher-level
inferences are directly activated by input text (FRUMP [DeJong,
1979] and IPP [Lebowitz, 1980] are notable examples). We
believed, though, that the relationship was even closer than
described by previous models—that the inference decision
mechanisms themselves were in some way interdependent at the very
least. For example, in the text;
The CIA called in an inspector to check for bugs.
The secretaries had reported seeing roaches.
the word "bugs" is ambiguous until the second sentence, yet the
first sentence alone implies an unambiguous reading. The "spy"
meaning of "bugs" initially appears to be more appropriate than
the "insect" meaning. The pragmatic inferences made during the
reading of the story are based upon the lexical inferences which
are made. Because of this interdependence between inference
levels, theories about pragmatic inference mechanisms must
include theories about ££££5^ processes.
Page 4
Lexical access is the process by which a word's meaning is
extracted from its written (or spoken) form. Recent research
into lexical access has led to the counter-intuitive conclusion
that when an ambiguous word is presented in context (i.e., a
sentence or phrase), 321 meanings of the word are initially
accessed, and context is subsequently consulted to determine the
most appropriate meaning [Swinney & Hakes, 1976; Tanenhaus,
Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979; Lucas, 1983; Granger, Holbrook, &
Eiselt, 1984]. This happens regardless of the syntactic category
of the word, or whether the context is biased toward one meaning
or another.
If the lexical access process does in fact work as described
above, and if individual words trigger the higher-level pragmatic
inferences, then it is likely that the pragmatic inference
decision process is much the same as the lexical inference
decision process. Work on ATLAST goes under the assumption that,
when more than one interpretation (i.e., pragmatic inference) of
an input text is possible, all possible interpretations are
pursued in parallel, and those interpretations which do not fit
well with the existing context are "de-activated" or inhibited.
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3.0 HOW ATLAST WORKS
3.1 Memory
ATLAST is built around a high-level episodic memory
structure which contains two kinds of memory organization packets
(MOPs) [Schank, 1982; Kolodner, 1984], For each word in
ATLAST's vocabulary there is a MOP which represents that word.
Most lexical-entry MOPs contain a one-way link to one or more
word-senses directly associated with that word, and syntactic
information about the word-senses. Function words, such as "a"
and "the", are not linked to other MOPs and serve only to aid in
syntactic decisions. The word-senses are an example of the other
kind of MOP in ATLAST's memory; those which represent events or
objects. These MOPs are interconnected through a network of
two-way links which serve to define the relationships between the
MOPs. These MOPs can be, but are not necessarily, directly
linked to lexical entries.
The inference decisions in ATLAST are carried out by three
primary components: the , the i>j:j2pjOjg£j:, and the
IlivXtjejr. Theoretically, these processes run in parallel.
However, ATLAST is written in UCI-LISP on a DECSySTEM-20, so the
parallelism which is so important to the theory is necessarily
simulated in its implementation. This simulation is accomplished
by repeatedly cycling through the three processes. Thus, the
Capsulizer runs for a pre-determined amount of time, followed by
the Proposer, then the Filter, then the Capsulizer again, and so
on. The amount of time each process is allocated is an important
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issue with respect to the accuracy of the model. This issue has
not yet been fully explored,
3.2 Capsulizer
The Capsulizer contains the first stage of a
similar in some respects to that
described by Frazier and Fodor [1978], The Capsulizer makes
f as opposed to inter-phrasal, syntactic decisions
about the words in the input text (again, see [Granger, Eiselt, &
Holbrook, 1985] for a discussion of the theory behind two-stage
syntactic analysis). As the Capsulizer encounters each new word
in the input text, it retrieves the syntactic category
information associated with that word (e.g., "this word can be
used as a noun and a verb") and activates any word-senses
associated with that word. The word-senses are not used in any
decisions made by the Capsulizer, though pointers to the
word-senses are retained. The activated word-senses serve as a
starting point for the search carried out by the Proposer, which
is described below.
As the Capsulizer processes the input words, it accumulates
the syntactic information it retrieves and makes initial
decisions about syntactic relationships within the phrases of the
input text. These intra-phrasal decisions, along with the
pointers to the word-senses which comprise the phrases, are
passed along to the Filter as "capsules" of information. The
Filter then makes decisions about the syntactic relationships
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between the phrases (i.e., syntax). If an input
word activates more than one word-sense (i.e., a word-sense
ambiguity), the pointers to the multiple word-senses are all
passed on to the Filter, which will eventually select the "best"
word-sense. This process is also described in more detail below.
3.3 Proposer
The Proposer gets its name from the idea that it "proposes"
possible inference paths which might explain the input text.
Essentially, it is a search mechanism which employs spreading
activation to traverse the links between the MOPs in memory and
find connections between word-senses which have been activated by
the Capsulizer.
The Proposer maintains pointers to the most recently
activated MOPs in memory, and to the word-senses which are the
origins of the spreading activation search. Each time the
Proposer is invoked, it traverses the links leading away from the
recently activated MOPs, activates the adjacent MOPs at the end
of those links, and updates its list of pointers. If the spread
of activation from one point of origin intersects the spread of
activation from some other point of origin, then the Proposer has
found some plausible relationship, by way of links and MOPs,
between two (and possibly more) of the word-senses activated by
the input text. The Proposer then passes information about this
newly-discovered pathway to the Filter; in this way, the
Proposer "proposes" possible inference paths for evaluation by
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the Filter.
Spreading activation has been employed in a number of models
[e.g., Quillian, 1968; Fahlman, 1979; Anderson, 1983;
Charniak, 1983]. Spreading activation allows ATLAST to pursue
multiple inference paths in parallel. Were this process allowed
to continue unchecked, it would lead to a combinatorial explosion
of inference paths. To prevent this from happening in ATLAST,
the third major process, the Filter, constantly evaluates or
"filters" inference paths and inhibits pursuit of those which
appear to be poor explanations of the input text. Though the
idea of beginning pursuit on all inference paths instead of just
the "appropriate" ones may seem both counter-intuitive and
counter-productive, there are two arguments for using this
approach. One is that it: would seem impossible to determine
which inferences may be appropriate without first evaluating all
inference possibilities. The second is that this approach is
consistent with experimental studies of human behavior
[Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus,
Leiman, & Bienkowski, 1982; Granger, Holbrook, & Eiselt, 1984].
The Proposer is implemented in ATLAST as a separate process,
but from a theoretical perspective it might be more appropriately
viewed as an emergent property of a human memory organization.
Computer memory seems to work somewhat differently than human
memory, though, so it was necessary to provide a separate process
to make the spreading activation possible.
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3.4 Filter
The Filter performs two functions; the first is that of
inter-phrasal syntax. As capsules are passed from the Capsulizer
to the Filter, the Filter makes decisions about the relationships
between the phrases represented by the capsules. Inter-phrasal
syntax rules enable the Filter to fill the Actor, Action, and
Object slots, for example. Future work on the ATLAST program
will add rules about modifying phrases, keeping track of
referents across phrases, and agreement of tense, number, and
gender, among other rules.
The Filter's other function is the evaluation of inference
paths. When two competing inference paths are proposed (e.g.,
different paths connecting the word-senses of two words from the
input text), the Filter attempts to select the more appropriate
path through the application of three inference evaluation
metrics.
First, the Filter evaluates the inference paths according to
the metric [Wilensky, 1983]. If one path is
determined to be less specific than the other, the less specific
path is inhibited; that is, the spread of activation from nodes
on the path is stopped, and that path is no longer considered as
a plausible explanation for the input text. Specificity is
determined by the links in the path; a path which includes a
"viewed-as" link (from the "view" relationship defined in
[Wilensky, 1984]) is less specific than a path which does not
contain such a link. In the example of Section 3.5, the CIA is a
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special case of a spy agency, but a spy agency can also be
an employer; an inference path which describes the CIA only
as a spy agency is more specific than one which explains it as a
spy agency jijj^ an employer.
If the specificity metric fails to make a decision between
two competing paths, the Filter applies two variations of the
i>AX&iJn£iI)iy metric [Granger, 1980], The first of these variations
(the "length" metric) gives precedence to the inference path with
fewer links. Failing this, the Filter applies the other
variation of the parsimony metric (the "explains more" metric),
which selects the path containing more word-sense MOPs directly
activated by the Capsulizer, whether those MOPs are the endpoints
of the path or somewhere in-between.
It is with the Filter that the implementation of ATLAST
diverges most from the theory. In some sense, this is to be
expected, since the Filter is the most complex of the three
processes. In theory, ATLAST should be able to evaluate and
inhibit pursuit of apparently implausible inference paths almost
as soon as pursuit has begun, thus preventing problems of
combinatorial explosion, ATLAST would accomplish this by
comparing the- multiple, possibly incomplete, inference paths
which begin with a specific word-sense to the context it has
built up to that point in the processing of the input text, and
determining which of the paths fit "best" with that context.
This would be in agreement with experimental results in lexical
access research [Tanenhaus, Leiman, & Seidenberg, 1979; Lucas,
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1983; Granger, Holbrook, & Eiselt, 1984], At this time, the
ATLAST model can only evaluate complete inference paths (i.e.,
those which connect two or more word-senses activated by the
Capsulizer) without regard to the existing context. Though this
simple inference evaluation mechanism seems to work for sentences
such as the one presented in the following example, it will not
be sufficient to properly interpret longer, more complicated
texts. This problem will be rectified in the near future.
3.5 An Example
What follows is actual annotated run-time output from the
ATLAST prototype program. This example illustrates primarily how
ATLAST disambiguates between two possible meanings of the word
"bugs" in the text, "The CIA checked for bugs." In the interest
of brevity and clarity, we use a very short text and just enough
of a knowledge base to process this example.
Processing begins
Input text is: (THE CIA CHECKED FOR BUGS *PERIOD*)
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: THE
No MOPs will.be activated from lexical entry
Begin sentence
Begin noun phrase
Proposer;
No activity
Filter:
No activity
The first word, "the", is processed by ATLAST. Though
Capsulizer recognizes that this marks the beginning of
a noun phrase, there are no relevant structures in
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memory to be activated. Thus, Proposer and Filter are
idle at this time.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: CIA
Proposer:
Initializing CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Spreading from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Activating SPY-AGENCY
Filter:
No activity
In this cycle, the memory structure
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is activated as a result of
reading "CIA". Proposer then begins to search along
the links leading from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY for
related memory structures, thus activating the more
general SPY-AGENCY.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: CHECKED
Sending capsule
End noun phrase
Begin verb phrase
Proposer:
Initializing SEARCH
Spreading from SEARCH
Activating REMOVE
Spreading from SPY-AGENCY
Activating GET-OTHERS-SECRETS
Activating PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
Activating GENERIC-EMPLOYER
Filter:
ACTOR slot filled by CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
The next word, "checked", terminates the noun phrase
and begins a verb phrase. Capsulizer sends a "capsule"
consisting of the word-senses initially activated by
the noun phrase (i.e., CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY) to
Filter. Filter, looking for an actor for this
sentence, fills the slot with this nouri-phrase capsule.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: FOR
No MOPS will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule
Begin prepositional phrase
Proposer:
Spreading from REMOVE
Activating REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
IPage 13
Activating REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
Spreading from GENERIC-EMPLOYER
Activating PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT
Spreading from PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
Found connections at REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
No MOPS activated from PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
Spreading from GET-OTHERS-SECRETS
Activating PLAnT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE
Filter:
New path discovered: IPATHO
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is a special case of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY has the goal PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS has the plan REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE is a special case Of REMOVE
REMOVE has the precondition SEARCH
ACTION slot filled by SEARCH
The preposition "for" does not activate any new memory
structures, but it does begin a modifying prepositional
phrase. Capsulizer sends the verb component of the
verb phrase (SEARCH) to Filter, which then assigns the
capsule to the action slot.
Proposer, looking for intersections among the
"wavefronts" of spreading activation, finds a
connection, or inference path (IPATHO), between
C^TRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY and SEARCH, and notifies
Filter. Filter knows of only one inference path at
this time, so there is no basis for comparison and
evaluation of inference paths yet.
Capsulizer:
Retrieving lexical entry: BUGS
Proposer:
Initializing INSECT
Initializing MICROPHONE
Spreading from INSECT
Found connections at REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
Path from INSECT to SEARCH
No MOPs activated from INSECT
Spreading from MICROPHONE
Found connections at PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE
Path from MICROPHONE to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Found connections at REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
Path from MICROPHONE to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Path from MICROPHONE to SEARCH
No MOPS activated from MICROPHONE
Spreading from REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
Found connections at PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT
Path from SEARCH to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Found connections at INSECT
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Path from SEARCH to INSECT
No MOPS activated from REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
Spreading from REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
Found connections at PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
Path from SEARCH to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Found connections at MICROPHONE
-Path from SEARCH to MICROPHONE
No MOPS activated from REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
Spreading from PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE
Found connections at MICROPHONE
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to MICROPHONE
No MOPS activated from PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE
Spreading from PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT
Found connections at REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to INSECT
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
No MOPS activated from PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT
Filter;
New path discovered; IPATHl
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is a special case of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the goal PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT
PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT has the plan REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD is a special case of REMOVE
REMOVE has the precondition SEARCH
New path discovered: IPATH2
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to INSECT
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is a special case of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY can be viewed as GENERIC-EMPLOYER
GENERIC-EMPLOYER has the goal PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT
PRESERVE-HEALTHY-ENVIRONMENT has the plan REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD has the role-filler INSECT
New path discovered: IPATH3
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to MICROPHONE
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is a special case of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY has the goal GET-OTHERS-SECRETS
GET-OTHERS-SECRETS has the plan PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE
PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE has the role-filler MICROPHONE
New path discovered: IPATH4
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is a special case of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY has the goal GET-OTHERS-SECRETS
GET-OTHERS-SECRETS has the plan PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE
PLANT-OWN-LISTENING-DEVICE has the role-filler MICROPHONE
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE is a special case of REMOVE
REMOVE has the precondition SEARCH
New path discovered: IPATH5
Path from SEARCH to MICROPHONE
SEARCH is a precondition of REMOVE
REMOVE has the special case REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE has the role-filler MICROPHONE
II
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New path discovered; IPATH6
Path from SEARCH to INSECT
SEARCH is a precondition of REMOVE
REMOVE has the special case REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD
REMOVE-HEALTH-HAZARD has the role-filler INSECT
New path discovered; IPATH7
Path from MICROPHONE to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE is a plan "Of PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS is a goal of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY has the special case CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Parsimony metric — IPATH7 explains more input than IPATH3
Specificity metric — IPATH4 more specific than IPATHl
Parsimony metric — IPATHO shorter than IPATH4
Capsulizer reads the ambiguous word "bugs", which
results in the activation of two word-senses; INSECT
and MICROPHONE. Proposer's search has uncovered
several new inference paths. When two different
inference paths connect the same two word-senses,
Filter applies inference evaluation metrics to the two
paths to determine which of the two provides the better
explanation of the input text. The rejected paths are
de-activated until later text results in activating
that path again.
Capsulizer;
Retrieving lexical entry; *PERIOD*
No MOPs will be activated from lexical entry
Sending capsule
End prepositional phrase
End verb phrase
End sentence
Proposer;
No activity
Filter;
OBJECT has competing slot fillers; INSECT vs. MICROPHONE
Specificity metric — IPATH7 more specific than IPATH2
Parsimony metric — IPATH5 explains more input than IPATH6
Word-sense ambiguity resolution; MICROPHONE vs. INSECT
All paths .through INSECT have been de-activated
The ambiguity is resolved — MICROPHONE selected
OBJECT slot filled by MICROPHONE
Capsulizer encounters the end of the text and sends to
Filter a capsule containing the word-senses activated
by the prepositional phrase. Filter determines that
the capsule contains the object of the action SEARCH,
and that this object is ambiguous. Filter attempts to
resolve this ambiguity by applying the inference
evaluation metrics to the remaining active inference
paths. Because MICROPHONE and INSECT are now known to
be competing word-senses. Filter treats IPATH7 and
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IPATH2 as competing inference paths. That is, although
IPATH7 connects MICROPHONE to
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY and IPATH2 connects INSECT
to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY, the two different paths
are evaluated as if they connected the same two
word-senses because INSECT and MICROPHONE were
activated by the same lexical entry ("bugs"). For this
same reason, IPATH5 is evaluated against IPATH6. This
evaluation results in the two remaining inference paths
containing INSECT to be de-activated, so Filter
resolves the ambiguity in favor of MICROPHONE. Below
is the active memory structure after all processing has
ended, followed by the pointers into the structure.
Processing completed
Active memory structure;
Path from MICROPHONE to CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
MICROPHONE is a role-filler of REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE is a plan Of PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS is a goal of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY has the special case CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Path from SEARCH to MICROPHONE
SEARCH is a precondition of REMOVE
REMOVE has the special case REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE has the role-filler MICROPHONE
Path from CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY to SEARCH
CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY is a special case of SPY-AGENCY
SPY-AGENCY has the goal PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS
PRESERVE-OWN-SECRETS has the plan REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE
REMOVE-OTHERS-LISTENING-DEVICE is a special case of REMOVE
REMOVE has the precondition SEARCH
Pointers to memory structure:
Actor: CENTRAL-INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY
Action: SEARCH
Object: MICROPHONE
3.6 An Observation On The Ordering Of Inference Metrics
While testing the ATLAST program, it became apparent that
the order of application of the pragmatic inference metrics
affected ATLAST's eventual interpretation of the input text. As
mentioned earlier, ATLAST applies its specificity metric first,
followed by the "length" metric, and then the "explains more"
metric. For the example of Section 3.5, this ordering of the
inference metrics results in the interpretation that the CIA was
II
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looking for hidden microphones. On the other hand, if the order
of application of the two parsimony metrics is reversed, ATLAST
arrives at a different, nonsensical interpretation.
Though this observation does not lead us to any meaningful
conclusions at this time, it provides an example of how ATLAST
can serve not only as a "proving ground" for theories, but also
as a source of new and interesting ideas worthy of further
investigation.
4.0 OPEN QUESTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The initial implementation of ATLAST raised a myriad of
implementation issues, many of which are yet to be resolved.
More importantly, the implementation again raised some open
questions which have been encountered by other researchers.
One question has to do with the timing of the three
inference processes running in parallel. We do not yet know how
much work each of the three processes should do in a given cycle,
though we have made arbitrary initial decisions. For the
Proposer in particular, there are issues which have been
addressed by some of the previous models utilizing spreading
activation [Quillian, 1968; Fahlman, 1979; Anderson, 1983];
How far does activation spread? Does activation decay with time?
Is there reinforcement when paths intersect? Though we do not
have answers to the questions now, ATLAST is designed to allow us
to change timing parameters easily, possibly enabling us to
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"tune" the model for cognitive accuracy as work proceeds.
Another question is concerned with the content of ATLAST's
memory. Currently, ATLAST runs with a high-level abstraction of
episodic memory; the relationships between the MOPs are fairly
well defined, but the details of the episodes themselves are
almost non-existent. Thus, information is stored in the links,
not in the nodes. The eventual addition of lower-level detail to
the episodes will require the application of yet unknown
qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, inference metrics.
Additionally, there is the issue of the organization of
memory. Whenever we, or other researchers, assume that specific
concepts are organized in specific ways in human memory (i.e.,
"this MOP is connected to that MOP by this relationship"), it is
nothing more than an educated guess. ATLAST's two parsimony
metrics depend on the specific organization of memory, rather
than content, for correct operation. If the memory had been
organized differently, so that there were a different number of
links between certain MOPs, for example, ATLAST's interpretation
of the input text would have been different. This particular
realization of the parsimony metrics is not necessarily
inaccurate, nor does the metrics' reliance on a particular
organization of memory invalidate ATLAST, any more than similar
implementation decisions invalidate any other models of human
understanding. It does, however, remind us that our
implementation decisions can have as great an impact as our
scientific theories on the perceived accuracy of our cognitive
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models, and that we should remain aware of where theoretical
issues end and implementation issues begin.
Obviously, much work remains to be done on ATLAST. The
current implementation has been applied only tp short texts. In
the future, we will process longer texts, and different types of
texts, in order to discover additional rules for inference
processing. The ATLAST model provides a framework for testing
theories, as well as for making predictions which can be verified
experimentally.
5.0 CONCLUSION
5.1 Summary
To some extent, ATLAST is a unification and refinement of
ideas from previous models of human inference processes at the
lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic levels. Yet, while ATLAST
shares common features with each of these models, in many ways it
is different from each of these same models. The features which
distinguish the ATLAST model from others are discussed in greater
detail in [Granger, Eiselt, & Holbrook, 1985]. A brief summary
of those features follows;
1. ATLAST unifies inference processing at three
distinct levels: the lexical, syntactic, and pragmatic
levels.
2. The separation of intra-phrasal and
inter-phrasal syntactic analysis enables ATLAST to
process texts which humans understand and to make the
same mistakes a human understander makes.
II
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3. The use of a spreading-activation memory model
allows ATLAST to pursue competing inference paths
simultaneously until syntactic or semantic information
suggests otherwise. Previous models of inference
decision processes either left a loose end or chose a
default inference when faced with an ambiguity [DeJong,
1979; Granger, 1980; Lebowitz, 1980; Granger, 1981;
Dyer, 1982; Wilensky, 1983],
4. The concurrent operation of ATLAST's
Capsulizer, Proposer, and Filter permits pragmatic
interpretations to be evaluated independently of
syntactic decisions. This parallel organization also
allows immediate evaluation and inhibition of competing
inference paths, thus minimizing combinatorial
explosion effects.
5. ATLAST conforms to the results of controlled
experiments on human subjects.
5.2 Final Comment
This paper describes how ATLAST attempts to understand only
a five-word sentence. At first glance, this hardly seems like
progress when one considers, for instance, that earlier systems
understood hundreds of newspaper stories; in fact, it might even
appear that work in natural language understanding is going
backwards, at least from a performance perspective. What is
really indicated by this phenomenon, though, is that we are
becoming more aware of the great quantity of knowledge and the
complexity of the processes which language understanders, both
human and otherwise, must bring to bear in understanding even the
simplest text. In this light, we should not measure the validity
of any model of understanding in terms of how many stories it
understands, how many words are in its vocabulary, or how fast it
runs. More appropriately, we should ask such questions as: Is
the model extensible? Does it compare favorably with
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experimental data? Is it learnable? Does it make testable
predictions? In other words, cognitive models should be
evaluated on the robustness of the theory which they embody.
Only when that metric is satisfied will the engineering issues
become relevant. From this perspective, it is safe to say that
ATLAST is a step in the right direction,
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